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Abstract: In light of the recent global financial crisis, the notion of financial fragility 
has become a cornerstone in current research programs of the dynamics of modern 
monetary production economies. This paper intends to contribute to the literature that 
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theoretical framework. Our aim is to extend this literature whereby considerable 
emphasis has been placed on the fragility of firms, but much less attention has been 
paid to the fragility of banks and its impact on macroeconomic performance. The 
paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that links the fragility of banks with 
the level of output. We put forward a Minskyan categorization for the economy’s 
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interaction between banks and the real economy is likely to lead to financial structures 
that are susceptible to financial instability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global economy has recently experienced severe bouts of financial disturbances 
with devastating feedback effects on macroeconomic performance and stability. In 
light of this turmoil, the notion of financial fragility has become quite fashionable in 
the analysis of the causes of the recent financial crisis. It is argued that issues of 
financial fragility should be at the centre of economy policy if similar turbulence is to 
be avoided in the future. 
 
The notion of financial fragility dates back to Keynes and Fisher. More recently, 
Minsky (1982, 1986) developed the financial instability hypothesis, which reveals 
“how a capitalist economy endogenously generates a financial structure which is 
susceptible to financial crises, and how the normal functioning of financial markets in 
the resulting boom economy will trigger a financial crisis” (Minsky, 1982, p.68). 
While Minsky did not develop a formal model of his ideas, several authors took up 
this task. In the constructed models particular attention has so far been paid to the 
definition of the fragility of firms and the conditions under which this fragility is 
likely to emerge (see Dos Santos, 2005 for a survey). 
 
Lavoie (1986-1987) has developed a model whereby the leverage ratio is utilized to 
capture the fragility of firms. Through an investment function that encapsulates 
Kaldorian characteristics the author examines the interaction between growth and 
firms’ fragility; it is indicated that the leverage ratio of firms exerts a negative impact 
on growth. The leverage ratio of firms is also at the centre of Delli Gatti and Gallegati 
(1990) analytical framework. These scholars have put forward an IS-LM model with 
an investment function that relies on the two price theory of Minsky; it is shown that 
financial fragility emerges only under certain conditions associated with the way the 
profits respond to an increase in the leverage ratio. Fazzari et al. (2001) have 
incorporated the two price theory of Minsky into a macroeconomic framework that 
emphasizes the optimistic expectations of firms and illustrate how macroeconomic 
cyclical fluctuations are likely to be generated. 
 
Arena and Raybaut (2001) have developed a Keynesian model of investment where 
cash flow and expected profit rate play a crucial role in the dynamics of financial 
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fragility. Within this formulation the authors indicate that business cycles will 
eventually arise in the economy. Keen (1995) has developed a model based on 
Goodwin’s frame with fragility characteristics captured by the debt to capital ratio. In 
Setterfield (2004), the fragility of the economy is portrayed as the difference between 
the accumulated debt and the savings of the private sector (firms and households). 
The model that is deployed examines the aggregate fluctuations as a result of the 
interaction among financial, industrial and household sectors. Another specification 
has been recently proposed by Bellofiore et al. (2009) whereby the firms’ fragility is 
associated with the overall financial exposition of the firm; this exposition is linked to 
the leverage ratio and the relative duration of the financial requirements and debt. 
 
In another group of models explicit emphasis has been placed on Minsky’s distinction 
between hedge, speculative and ponzi firms.
1
 Foley (2003) first established the 
Minskyan categorization in a Kaleckian model. Firms are deemed as hedge when their 
rate of profit is higher both than the rate of investment and the rate of interest. In the 
case that the rate of profit is lower than the rate of investment but higher than the rate 
of interest firms are classified as speculative. Ponzi firms exist in the case that the rate 
of profit is lower than the rate of interest. In his model the economy reach equilibrium 
after hovering upon a ponzi situation. In similar lines, Lima and Meirelles (2006, 
2007) have defined the three finance regimes according to the capacity of firms to 
finance their investment expenditures and interest payments from their profits. Their 
analysis focuses attention on the conditions under which each of these regimes is 
likely to prevail. Arza and Espanol (2008) have utilized this categorization of Minsky 
in order to identify whether the firms during 1992-2001 in Argentina were financially 
constrained. In their analysis the distinction between hedge, speculative and ponzi 
firms relies on the extent to which the profits of firms cover the interest and short-
term debt. Charles (2008b) has applied Minsky’s categorization by using the interest 
payments to profit ratio as a measure of the fragility of firms. Financial fragility 
                                                 
1
 “A unit is hedge financing at a particular date when at that date the expected gross capital income 
exceeds by some margin the payment commitments due to debts in every relevant period over the 
horizon given by the debts now on the books and the borrowings that must be made if expected gross 
capital income is to be earned…A unit speculates when for some periods the cash payment 
commitments on debts exceed the expected gross capital income…Ponzi units are speculative units 
with the special characteristic that for some if not all near term periods cash payment commitments to 
pay interest are not covered by the income portion of the expected excess of receipts over current labor 
and material costs” (Minsky, 1982, pp.25-28). 
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appears to be the most likely result in a model where the fragility of firms is allowed 
to interact with economic growth.
2
 
 
One limitation of the aforementioned models is, however, that no explicit 
consideration has so far been made to the fragility of banks, which is extremely 
relevant in the context of the recent financial crisis (see e.g. Dymski, 2010). 
Furthermore, the active role of banks has to a great extent been neglected (see e.g. 
Dos Santos, 2005; Kregel, 1997).
3
 The aim of this paper is to develop a Post 
Keynesian macroeconomic model with Minskyan insights that places explicit 
emphasis on the aforementioned issues. 
 
The distinct features of our model have as follows. First, we explicitly define the 
fragility of banks and incorporate it in our frame. The fragility of banks is portrayed 
by relying on the relationship between loans and deposits, which draws on the 
formalizations of Forman et al. (1984), Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) and Dos Santos 
and Macedo e Silva (2009). Second, we elaborate an extended Minskyan version of 
the financing situations into which the economy can be located, taking into account 
both firms’ and banks’ fragility. Third, we use phase-diagrammatic analysis in order 
to explore the interaction between the fragility of banks, credit rationing procedures, 
and output changes. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the structure of the model is set out. 
Section 3 presents the extended Minskyan financing situations of the economy. 
Section 4 studies the interaction between banks’ fragility and output and explicates 
the conditions under which the economy is likely to become financially fragile. 
Furthermore, it addresses the effects of a change in the credit rationing responsiveness 
of banks to their own fragility. A few concluding remarks follow in section 5. 
 
2. The structure of the model 
 
                                                 
2
 The above-mentioned analysis of Minsky’s financial fragility does not take into account the 
distinction between liquidity and solvency problems (see Vercelli, 2009 for a related work) and it 
strictly refers to the ‘basic’ Minsky cycle (see Palley, 2009). 
3
 An exception is the model of Setterfield (2004). 
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Our economy is composed of households, firms, banks and a central bank. 
Households are assumed not to get bank loans and to keep their wealth only in the 
form of bank deposits. Firms are portrayed to finance their investment plans using 
loans and gross profits. Banks are hypothesized to always accept deposits from the 
households; their profits are not distributed, implying that their net worth is different 
from zero.
4
 Central bank sets the discount interest rate. 
 
Households receive income in form of wage bill and interest on deposits, and use it in 
order to buy consumption goods and save. The wage bill of households is given by: 
 
YW                                                                                                                      (1) 
 
where W is workers’ wage bill, Ω is the wage share in nominal aggregate income and 
Y is output. Note that in our model inflation is assumed away and the level of prices is 
equal to unity. 
 
Firms use sale receipts to pay wages and interest on loans, retaining the rest to finance 
investment or to repay loans. Equation (2) gives the gross profits of firms, GPF , 
which are equal to profits after subtracting workers’ wage bill: 
 
WYPF G                                                                                                                (2) 
 
The net profits of firms, PF, are equal to the gross profits of firms minus the interest 
payments due to their outstanding debt: 
 
LiPFPF L
G                                                                                                           (3) 
 
where Li  is the lending interest rate and L is the loans of firms (outstanding amount). 
 
Banks’ profits, PB, are given by: 
                                                 
4
 This assumption for the retained profits of banks is in line with Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) and 
Foley and Taylor (2006). An alternative hypothesis would be to presume that the profits of the banks 
are distributed to the households, as in van Treeck (2009), Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch. 10), Lavoie 
and Godley (2001-2002) and Zezza and Dos Santos (2004). 
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DBiBiLiPB DBBL                                                                                                (4) 
 
where Bi  is the interest rate on the safe asset, B is the amount of the safe assets the 
banks hold (e.g. treasury bills), DBi  is the interest rate on deposits and DB is the 
amount of deposits held by households. 
 
As far as the interest rates are concerned, we have that: 
 
idiDB                                                                                                                       (5) 
 
iliL                                                                                                                          (6) 
 
where d is the mark-down and l is the mark-up over the interest rate, i, that is set by 
the monetary policy of the central bank. Note that d and l are exogenously given in 
our analysis. 
 
It is presumed that there are two types of households with different propensities to 
consume out of their disposable income. The first type of household receives only 
wage income and consumes all of it. The second type of household receives both 
wage and interest income and has a propensity to consume out of total disposable 
income lower than one. Consequently, in our consumption function the propensity to 
consume out of wage income is lower than one. In particular: 
 
DBicWcC DB21                                                                                                        (7) 
 
where 1,0 12  cc . 
 
The savings of households are held in the form of deposits in banks (see e.g. Lavoie 
and Godley, 2006 and Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch. 7). Thus: 
 
CWDBiDB DB 

                                                                                                  (8) 
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In our analysis we adopt the distinction between the desired investment of firms, DI , 
and the effective one, Ι (see Le Heron and Mouakil, 2008 for an alternative approach). 
The latter is equal to the former after subtracting the amount of loans that are credit 
rationed by banks, CRL . In particular: 
 
CRD LII                                                                                                                  (9) 
 
The above equation implies that an increase in the new amount of loans that are credit 
rationed diminishes the effective amount of investment. This allows us to pinpoint the 
negative effect that credit rationing is likely to exert on effective investment. 
 
Following the distinction between the effective and the desired investment, we further 
distinguish between the desired and the effective change in loans. The latter, L , is 
given by the following equation: 
 
CRD LLL  

                                                                                                              (10) 
 
where DL  stands for the demanded change in loans. Overall, the change in the 
effective amount of new loans adjusts according to the change in demanded loans and 
the change in credit rationed loans.
5
 Since the amount of credit rationed loans is 
always a fraction of the demanded amount of loans it invariably holds that DCR LL   . 
Equation (10) draws attention to the fact that there always exists an unsatisfied fringe 
of borrowers in the loan market. In other words, it points out the crucial role of credit 
rationing, which has been neglected in the related Minskyan macroeconomic models 
whereby the actual amount of new loans has in most cases been conceptualized to be 
equal to the desired one by firms (see e.g. Lima and Meirelles, 2007). It should be 
noted that our formalization builds on the recent Post Keynesian literature on credit 
rationing (see, among others, Dow, 1998; Wolfson, 1996; Grabel, 1995; Lavoie, 
1996; Parguez, 2001; Setterfield, 2004; Rochon, 1999; Ramskogler, 2009). 
 
                                                 
5
 For a similar specification see Taylor (1994). 
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The desired amount of new loans is given by: 
 
PFIL DD                                                                                                            (11) 
 
Equation (11) shows that firms’ demand for external finance is equal to their desired 
investment expenditures minus the net profits (see Minsky, 1995; Lima and Meirelles, 
2007; Charles, 2008b).
6
 
 
Our desired investment function is expressed as: 
 
YaPFaaI D 210                                                                                                 (12) 
 
where 2,1,0,0  iai . The investment function incorporates the animal spirits, 0a , of 
entrepreneurs, the net profits of firms, PF, and the level in the actual output, Y.
7
 The 
last term captures the positive impact of euphoric expectations on desired investment, 
as in Minsky (1982) and Fazzari et al. (2008). The higher is the increase (decline) in 
the level of output, the more (less) firms are willing to undertake more risky 
investment projects. 
 
The amount of new loans that are credit rationed is captured by the following 
function: 
 
YbFbPFbbL BCR 3210 
                                                                                   (13) 
 
3,2,1,0, ibi  are positive parameters; 0b  denotes the ‘animal spirits’ of  banks with 
respect to loan expansion, BF  is the fragility of banks and Y the level of output 
captures the banks’ euphoric expectations. 
 
                                                 
6
 As Minsky (1986, p. 207) emphasizes: “the internal funds that are available to finance investment 
need to be augmented by outside funds and that in the decision to invest, the availability of outside 
financing is a key element”. 
7
 For similar investment functions see Charles (2008a) and Jarsulic (1996). 
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Higher animal spirits of banks imply lower amount of credit rationing.
8
 These spirits 
are assumed to be affected, among other factors, by the level of exogenous confidence 
of banks, the degree of financial innovations (e.g. securitization) etc. In this sense we 
apply the notion of fundamental uncertainty proposed by Keynes (1936), Davidson 
(1991), Dymski (1992)
9
 to the uncertain environment in which banks operate (see also 
Rochon, 1999, p. 280 for such a recommendation). 
 
The second term represents the impact that the firms’ creditworthiness may have on 
the change in credit rationed loans. The higher the net profits of firms, the higher is 
the firms’ creditworthiness and in turn the lower the amount of credit rationing. This 
variable captures the Keynesian uncertainty over the ability of borrowers to repay 
their loans. In such circumstances, “the businessman answers the financier’s question, 
how will you get the monies to meet the obligations to pay? by pointing to the 
prospective cash flows” (Minsky, 1991, p.6). More specifically, the banks provide 
loans to all borrowers that are deemed creditworthy according to their net income 
(Rochon, 1999, p. 279; Moore, 2001, p.25; Franke and Semmler, 1989; Bhaduri, 
2010).
10
 
 
Moreover, an important point needs to be stressed here. The amount of firms’ 
creditworthiness is subject to fluctuation as the individual’s own financial 
circumstances change (see Basu; 2003, Rochon; 1999, for a similar argument). In this 
context we could take also into account that banks could keep some minimum 
requirements with respect to firms’ creditworthiness in order to supply credit 
(Wolfson, 1996; Rochon, 1999). Hence, tighter credit standards would imply a direct 
form of credit rationing (Wolfson, 1996, p.459). As Dymski (2005, p.450) 
emphasizes, customers that do not meet these standards will turn to second tier 
                                                 
8
 It is worthy to mention Wolfson’s (1996) argument that both borrowers and lenders are subject to the 
same fundamental uncertainty. Moreover, Tymoigne (2006, p.5) claims that the “expectations are 
bounded by what is considered to be reasonable/ normal by the most pessimistic economic sector.” Our 
specific argument follows the latter statement that the animal spirits of firms and the animal spirits of 
banks can be different. 
9
 Dymski (1992, p.314) proposes to use both asymmetric information and Keynesian uncertainty in 
order to describe banks’ willingness to supply credit. 
10
 Dymski (1988) provides a framework where banks are gathering information as far as the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers. See Wray (1989), Dymski (1989), Heise (1992), van Ees and 
Garretsen (1993), Dymski (1993) and Piegay (1999-2000) for further comments. 
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markets, where they will meet substantial credit rationing
11
 or they may turn to 
informal credit markets (see Basu, 2003, p.239). In expression (13) the higher (lower) 
is 1b  the more (less) banks take account of the creditworthiness of firms in the 
provision of new loans. 
 
Turning to the third term of function (13), the banks’ fragility is defined as the 
difference between the effective loans and deposits of households:
12
 
 
DBLF B                                                                                                               (14) 
 
The higher is the amount of loans in excess of deposits in the balance sheet of banks 
the greater is the risk of illiquidity and insolvency. Hence, it is reasonable to argue 
that the higher is the fragility of banks, the higher is the amount of new loans that are 
credit rationed, since banks perceive their illiquidity and insolvency risk to increase.
13
 
Of particular importance for our analysis is parameter 2b , which represents the 
responsiveness of credit rationing procedure to the fragility of banks. The higher is 
this parameter the more banks take into account their own liquidity and solvency 
position and thereby the more the fragility of banks affects the amount of loans that 
are credit rationed. 
 
The fourth term in function (13) reflects the impact of the output on banks’ credit 
rationing. We argue that as, the firms become more optimistic within periods of 
tranquility, it is also banks that become more optimistic when output increases. This 
behavior of banks is based on two aspects. On the one hand, there is the Minskyan 
                                                 
11
 This idea rests on what Dymski (2005, p.440) refers as ‘financial exclusion’, which refers to the 
failure of the formal banks to offer credit and depository services. 
12
 For a similar definition of fragility of banks see Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009). See also 
Forman et al. (1984) and Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) whereby the ratio of loans to deposits is used in 
order to capture the liquidity pressure of the banking sector. Also other economists have recognized 
that banks are interested in keeping specific ratios of its assets to liabilities. In most of these models the 
authors focus on the liquidity of banks in order to measure the lending capacity of the whole sector and 
their performance towards fundamental uncertainty and not especially for banks’ fragility. Dymski 
(1988) proposed that banks hold a specific asset to deposit ratio while Alves et al. (2008) used the ratio 
of reserves to deposits and the leverage ratio in order to examine banks’ liquidity and credit risk. 
Another example is the stock-flow model in Godley (1999) who has figured out banks with a specific 
norm for the ratio of bills to liabilities. Lavoie and Godley (2006) and Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch. 
10) have complemented the previous analysis by formalizing banks to take into account a specific bills 
to deposits ratio. 
13
 For similar arguments see Wolfson (1990, p. 349; 1995, p. 353), Paula and Alves (2006) and Eatwell 
et al. (2008). 
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analysis. Minsky (1986, p.132),
14
 Paula and Alves (2006), Grabel (1995, p.136), 
Palley (1994) and Alves et al. (2008, p.398) pinpoint that over the business cycle both 
bankers and their borrowing business customers have expectations that change. When 
they both have favorable views about the future banks become accommodative and 
they are able to amplify the economic growth, whereas unfavorable views lead 
bankers and their business customers to contract loans. Palley (1994, p. 380) 
recognizes that increasing prosperity is the culprit that enables borrowers and lenders 
to become more optimistic while it enables them to take more leverage. 
 
The other aspect is the competitive analysis behavior of banks (Basu, 2003, p.238; 
Dymski and Pollin, 1992, p.45; Grabel, 1995, p.142; Paula and Alves, 2006). It is 
suggested that high competition, seen through increasing prosperity and high output, 
compels banks relax their credit behavior and engage in risky activities in order to 
cement their institutional position. This ‘asymmetric reward structure’, as Crotty 
(1996) names it, rewards more and punish less the aggressive banks. 
 
3. An extended Minskyan taxonomy for the financial fragility of the economy 
 
Minsky emphasizes that the financial fragility of the economy can be determined by 
the financial conditions of its units. In the spirit of Minsky, we define the financial 
fragility of the economy based on the fragility of firms along with the fragility of 
banks. As Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009, p. 23) point out, the economy is 
getting more fragile whenever the fragility of firms and/or the fragility of banks are 
increasing. 
 
Let us first portray the fragility of firms.
15
 Following Lima and Meirelles (2006, 
2007), the classification of firms as hedge or speculative depends on whether their 
gross profits are sufficient or not to cover their investment expenditures plus the 
interest payments. In particular, if the gross profits are higher than investment 
                                                 
14
 “A history of success will tend to diminish the margin of safety that business and bankers require and 
will thus tend to be associated with increases investment, a history of failure will do the opposite” 
(Minsky, 1986, p.209). 
15
 See section 1 for some alternative definitions of firms’ fragility within the Minskyan framework. It 
should be noted that our analysis does not consider the possibility of ponzi firms, since it is deemed 
that at the macro-level the net profits are difficult to be negative, at least in the context of a closed 
economy. 
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expenditures plus the interest payments, the firms are deemed as hedge. This implies 
that at the aggregate level the new amount of loans is negative.
16
 On the other hand, if 
the sum of effective investment plus the interest payments is higher than the gross 
profits, firms are classified as speculative. Therefore, a Minskyan taxonomy can be 
derived as follows: 
 
Hedge firms: LiIY L  )1(                       or                  0L
                         (15) 
 
Speculative firms: LiIY L  )1(               or                 0L
                         (16) 
 
We use equation (9) along with equations (1) to (3) and (12) to (14) and substitute it 
in the previous equations in order to consider the hedge and speculative firms in 
connection with the fragility of banks. After some manipulations we finally obtain:
17
 
 
Hedge firms: 
 
Y
bibiai
baba
bibiai
ba
F
LLLLLL
F
H
B 






211
3211
211
00 )1)((1                                (17) 
 
Speculative firms:  
 
Y
bibiai
baba
bibiai
ba
F
LLLLLL
F
S
B 






211
3211
211
00 )1)((1                                (18) 
 
It is also possible to derive the corresponding demarcation line in the (Y, BF ) space: 
 
                                                 
16
 This does not exclude the possibility that at the micro level there exist firms that get a positive 
amount of new loans. However, the amount of loans that is repaid from the other firms is higher 
resulting in a negative loan expansion at the aggregate level. 
17
 In our analysis we have adopted the simplifying assumptions that 1112  bac  and LDB ii  . In 
other words we assume that the income from the deposits is entirely consumed. This has permitted us 
to derive a two-dimensional system instead of a three-dimensional one which would significantly 
complicate our analysis. Also, these assumptions permit us to have a diagrammatical representation of 
the dynamic system and the firms’ fragility demarcation line (see section 4). We contend that these 
assumptions do not change the essence of our arguments. 
 14 
Y
bibiai
baba
bibiai
ba
F
LLLLLL
F
SH
B 







211
3211
211
00 )1)((1                              (19) 
 
where F SH
BF |  is the level of banks’ fragility corresponding to the regime transition 
from hedge to speculative firms, as shown in figure 1. It should be pointed out that in 
figure 1 we have depicted the case in which the slope of the demarcation line is 
positive. This corresponds to regime I that will be developed in section 4. In the 
subsequent section we will also consider the case of a negative-sloped demarcation 
line. 
 
It is worth pinpointing that the positive slope of firms’ demarcation line indicates that, 
as the level of output increases, the fragility of banks needs to become higher in order 
to firms remain hedge. The rationale is that a higher level of output puts upward 
pressure on firms’ loans and effective investment, under regime I, which have to be 
counterbalanced by a higher level of bank’s fragility that has an opposite effect on 
new loans.
18
 
 
                                   Fig. 1. The classification of firms 
 
Regarding the fragility of banks we follow Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009) and 
distinguish between hedge and speculative banks. If banks hold enough deposits in 
                                                 
18
 Under regime I we assume that 
32
ba   in order to take a positive slope for the firms’ 
demarcation line. Under regime II, the opposite condition holds implying a negative slope of the firms’ 
demarcation line. The rationale is that an increase in output rises loans and effective investment but this 
is overcompensated by the increase in the gross profits of firms. Consequently, hedge firms can have a 
large amount of output with a smaller amount of banks’ fragility. 
Hedge firms 
Speculative firms 
Y 
BF  
0 
F
SH
BF

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order to cover the amount of loans on their balance sheet they are defined as hedge. In 
the opposite case, they are classified as speculative. More specifically, we have that: 
 
Hedge banks: DBL                                                                                                 (20) 
 
Speculative banks: DBL                                                                                         (21) 
 
If we substitute equation (14) into the previous equations after some manipulations we 
obtain: 
 
Hedge banks: 0| BH
BF                                                                                             (22) 
 
Speculative banks: 0| BS
BF                                                                                     (23) 
 
In the case that banks’ fragility is smaller or equal to zero then banks can be 
characterized as hedge. On the contrary, speculative banks are characterized by a 
banks’ fragility greater than zero. This is the case in which the deposits in the balance 
sheet of banks are lower than their loans, implying that liquidity problems are more 
likely to emerge. 
 
Let us also derive the corresponding demarcation line this time for banks in the (Y, 
BF ) space: 
 
0| 
B
SH
BF                                                                                                                 (24) 
 
where B SH
BF |  is the level of banks’ fragility corresponding to the regime transition 
from hedge banks to speculative banks which is tantamount to the output axis, as 
shown in figure 2. 
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                                 Fig. 2. The classification of banks. 
 
We now turn to put together figures 1 and 2 in order to depict the overall picture for 
the financial fragility of the economy. There are four different situations that may 
emerge. There is first the possibility of an ‘ultra hedge’ economy characterized by 
hedge banks and hedge firms; both output and banks’ fragility are low. This situation 
corresponds to the area on the left of the demarcation line of the firms and below the 
demarcation line of banks. Both sectors are deemed to have a low illiquidity risk. The 
‘semi speculative type I’ economy is the case where the firms are characterized as 
speculative and banks are conceived as hedge; banks’ fragility is low and output is 
high. This situation is depicted by the area on the right of the demarcation line of 
firms and underneath the demarcation line of banks. The financial fragility of the 
economy is higher relative to the aforementioned situation since there is a higher 
possibility for firms to face liquidity problems. 
 
The third possibility is that of a ‘semi speculative type II’ economy where banks are 
speculative and firms are hedge, while the economy exhibits low output and high 
banks’ fragility. This case is captured by the zone on the left of the demarcation line 
of the firms and above the demarcation line of banks. In this situation banks’ deposits 
are lower than their loans and thereby their loan position has to be funded by further 
resources. This makes banks more fragile. Our last case is the ‘ultra speculative’ 
economy where both sectors are characterized by speculative finance; both output and 
banks’ fragility are high. It is located to the right of the demarcation line of firms and 
over the demarcation line of banks. This is the case where the financial fragility of the 
Speculative banks 
Hedge banks 
BF  
0 Y 
0| 
B
SH
BF  
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economy is the largest compared to all the previous ones. There is excessive financial 
fragility in the economy since both sectors are susceptible to liquidity problems. 
                
          Fig. 3. The overall classification of the economy. 
 
4. The dynamic behaviour of the model and the emergence of financial fragility 
 
This section deals with the dynamic interaction between banks’ fragility and the 
output of the economy. We derive a two dimensional system and set out the equations 
that will be the basis of our analysis for the emergence of financial fragility. 
 
The change in output is captured by the following equation (see also Asada, 2004): 
 
)( YICeY 

                                                                                                        (25) 
 
where 10  e  is a positive parameter. Replacing C from equation (7), I from 
equation (9) and making use of equations (1) to (3), and (10) to (14) we find the 
mechanism for the motion of output. The next step consists in substituting the fragility 
of banks for loans and the amount of deposits from equation (14). After some 
manipulations we ultimately obtain: 
 
})())1)((1({ 1123211100
B
LL FibiabYbabacbaeY 

     (26) 
 
Y 
BF  
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Semi speculative 
type I economy 
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SH
B
F

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
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Having presented the mechanism of output we now turn to the way that the real 
economy affects the change in the fragility of banks. Differentiating BF  from 
equation (14) with respect to time we get: 
 
BDLF B                                                                                                                (27) 
 
We introduce equations (10) and (8) into the previous equation and by combining 
equations (1) to (3), (7) and (11) to (14) we end up with: 
 
B
LLL
B FbibiaiYbabacbaF  )())1)((1( 2113211100
  (28) 
 
Equations (26) and (28) constitute an autonomous two-dimensional system of 
differential equations, in which the derivatives of Y and BF  depend on the levels of Y 
and BF  as well as on the parameters of the system. We can therefore analyze the 
interaction of the economy with banks’ fragility by estimating the Jacobian matrix of 
the system and using a standard phase diagrammatic analysis. 
 
The partial derivatives of the Jacobian matrix have as follows: 
 
0/ 21111 

bibiaiFF LLL
BB                                                                (29) 
 
))1)((1(/ 3211112 babacYF
B 

                                           (30) 
 
0)(/ 21121 

bibiaeFY LL
B                                                                   (31) 
 
))1)((1(/ 3211122 babaceYY 

                                            (32) 
 
Not all of the above partial derivatives can be unambiguously signed. In particular, 
the sign of 11 , 21  is negative but the sign of 12  and 22  depends on the sign of 
32111 )1)((1 babac  . The negative sign of expression (29) implies that 
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the change in the fragility of banks is negatively affected by the level of banks’ 
fragility. On the one hand, an increase in the fragility of banks makes the loans that 
are credit rationed higher; it also decreases the desired amount of new loans since it 
leads to lower net profits and thereby to lower desired investment. On the other hand, 
a higher fragility of banks exerts an upward pressure on the new amount of loans that 
are demanded due to the higher interest payments of firms. Overall, under the 
assumptions of the model the former effects counterbalance the latter one. Equation 
(31) implies a negative effect of banks’ fragility on the output change. An increase in 
the fragility of banks makes higher the amount of new loans that are credit rationed 
with negative feedback effects on economic activity. Further, an increase in the 
fragility of banks decreases the desired investment since it increases the interest 
obligations of firms.  
 
We now proceed to construct the standard phase diagrams. The first step consists in 
finding the shape of isoclines 

Y  and 

BF  from equations (26) and (28). As far as the 
former isocline is concerned, we get: 
 
Y
bibia
babac
bibia
ba
F
LLLL
Y
B 








211
32111
211
00
0
)1)((1
                            (33) 
 
211
321110 )1)((1
bibia
babac
Y
F
LL
Y
B







                                                       (34) 
 
We can see that 0

Y  is a straight line with positive or negative slope depending on 
the sign of 32111 )1)((1 babac  . 
 
For the banks’ fragility isocline we obtain: 
 
Y
bibiai
babac
bibiai
ba
F
LLLLLL
F
B
B









211
32111
211
00
0
)1)((1
                  (35) 
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
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



211
321110 )1)((1
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Y
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F
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B
                                                       (36) 
 
The results for the shape of the 0

BF  line indicate that it is a straight line with a 
positive or negative slope depending on the sign of 32111 )1)((1 babac  . 
At this point of the analysis we introduce two possible regimes the economy can rest 
upon (see table 1). Regime I is the case where the economy is characterized by a large 
propensity to consume out of wage income and a high elasticity of investment and 
credit rationing with respect to the expectations that are formed as a result of 
upswings and downturns. Under Regime II there is a low propensity to consume out 
of wage income and a small elasticity of investment and credit rationing with respect 
to the expectations that are formed as a result of changes in the level of output. 
 
Regime I Regime II
a2, b3 high low
c1 high low
1-c1Ω-(a1+b1)(1-Ω)-a2-b3 - +
J11 - -
J12 + -
J21 - -
J22 + -
Det(J) + -
Tr(J) -
Equilibrium point stable saddle
Figure 4 5  
Table 1. The two regimes. 
 
We first focus attention on regime I. Under this regime expression (30) is positive. 
More specifically, an increase in output increases firms’ creditworthiness and banks’ 
expectations and therefore it decreases the new amount of loans that are credit 
rationed. Furthermore, an increase in output increases the net profits of firms as well 
as their expectations, placing upward pressures on the desired investment and in turn 
on the desired amount of new loans. Hence, according to these forces the banks’ 
fragility tends to increase. However, this positive impact may be overwhelmed by 
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forces which tend to decrease banks’ fragility. More specifically, the increase in 
output increases the internal finance of firms and thereby decreases the amount of 
new loans that firms desire to take; further, it increases the amount of new deposits. In 
regime I the positive impact overcompensates the negative impact one. This implies 
that an increase in output exerts an upward pressure on the change in the fragility of 
banks. 
 
As far as the sign of equation (32) is concerned, this is positive under regime I and 
implies that, when output becomes higher, the change in output goes up. The increase 
in output increases firms’ creditworthiness and banks’ expectations; therefore the 
amount of loans that are credit rationed decreases. There is also an increase in net 
profits and firms’ expectations that brings about a rise in the desired investment. Both 
outcomes make effective investment increase. Moreover, a rise in output increases 
wage income and thereby consumption expenditures. Under regime I, the condition 
for equilibrium in the output market does not hold and hence an increase in the level 
of output leads to an increase in the change of output. 
 
In regime I 12  and 21  are positive and thus )(Det  is positive and )(Tr  turns 
negative.
19
 This implies a stable point as figure 4 indicates. Overall, under the 
assumptions of regime I expressions (34) and (35) are positive, which leads us to 
draw the phase diagram portrayed in figure 4.
20
 Figure 4 also shows the position of 
the demarcation line of the firms’ fragility. The area above the firms’ fragility 
demarcation line characterizes the firms as hedge while in the opposite case they are 
characterized as speculative. We can see that in the intersection of the isoclines firms 
are always characterized as hedge.
21
 
 
                                                 
19
 Under the assumption that ))1)((1(
321112
babaceb  . 
20
 Under regime I the slope of the output isocline is smaller than the slope of the banks’ fragility 
isocline since the denominator of the former is larger than that of the latter and under the assumption of 
regime I that 0)1)((1
32111
 babac . Further, in order to attain a positive equilibrium 
output under regime I it is assumed that 0
00
 ba . 
21
 The banks’ fragility isocline has a larger slope than the firms’ fragility demarcation line since 
 )11( c . To the extent that these isoclines have the same intercept, the equilibrium point will be 
characterized by hedge firms under regime I and II. 
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Figure 4 indicates the possibility of cycles. Assume that the economy is initially at the 
‘ultra hedge’ situation (hedge firms, hedge banks) where both output and banks’ 
fragility are low. Because of the low level of debt, firms’ desired investment is 
increasing; simultaneously, low banks’ fragility leads them to decrease the credit 
rationed loans contributing to the expansion of the economy, since the new amount of 
effective loans is increasing. At some point the amount of gross profits does not cover 
investment expenditures and interest payments; thus, the economy slides into the 
‘semi speculative type I’ situation (speculative firms, hedge banks). 
 
The expansion of the economy continues and is reinforced by the euphoric 
expectations of both firms and banks. At some point banks’ fragility starts to increase, 
whereas the amount of effective loans becomes larger than the amount of the 
households’ deposits turning the economy to the ‘ultra speculative’ situation where 
both firms and banks are speculative. This is the occasion that the economy is found 
with the largest degree of financial fragility. Gradually, the high level of banks’ 
fragility starts having negative feedback effects on the output of the economy, since 
effective investment decreases as a result of higher credit rationing and lower internal 
funds. The decrease in output leads the economy to the ‘speculative type II’ situation 
(speculative banks, hedge firms). Furthermore, the fragility of banks starts decreasing 
again as a result of credit restriction. Eventually, the decreasing fragility of banks 
leads the economy to the ‘ultra hedge’ situation; then, the stage is set for a new cycle 
until the equilibrium point E is reached. 
 
Fig. 4. Phase diagram for Y and BF  under regime I. 
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Under regime II equation (30) is negative; the positive effect of higher output on the 
internal funds of firms and on the new deposits more than offsets the negative impact 
that higher output has on the fragility of firms, as a result of the increase that it 
triggers on the desired investment and the amount of loans that are not credit rationed. 
 
The sign of equation (32) is also negative since under regime II the equilibrium 
condition for the product market is satisfied. It follows that )(Det  is negative and 
hence the equilibrium is an unstable saddle point irrespective of the sign of )(Tr . 
Figure 5 depicts the dynamics of regime II. Also, we introduce in the figure the firms’ 
fragility demarcation line. It is worthwhile to pinpoint that above this line hedge firms 
are depicted while below it they are situated speculative firms.
22
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Phase diagram for Y and BF  under regime II. 
 
What counts are the initial conditions. In the occasion the economy is within the area 
on the right of the demarcation line characterizing the fragility of firms and below the 
demarcation line of the fragility of banks the most possible scenario is for both firms 
and banks to remain hedge with low banks’ fragility and high output. This is similar 
to the result of Lima and Meirelles (2007) where, if the equilibrium is located into the 
firms’ hedge area, along with a procyclical banking mark-up and a growth rate larger 
                                                 
22
 Under regime II the slope of the output isocline is larger than the slope of the banks’ fragility isocline 
since the denominator of the former is larger than that of the latter and under the assumption of the 
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than the interest rate, the firms will remain hedge. If the economy is within the zone 
of speculative banks and firms the high level of fragility has an unfavourable impact 
on the level of output while the low level of output further exerts upward pressures on 
the fragility of banks. Thus, the economy can be trapped into the ‘ultra-speculative’ 
area. Finally, if the economy is initially within a ‘semi-speculative’ zone there are 
almost equal possibilities the economy to slide into the ‘ultra-hedge’ or ‘ultra-
speculative’ zone. 
 
A further step in our analysis is to examine the impact of an increase in parameter 2b . 
Recall that this parameter captures the responsiveness of credit rationing to the 
fragility of banks. Such an increase may be caused for instance by a change in the 
institutional structure of banking sector or by an exogenous decrease in the confidence 
of banks with respect to their liquidity problems.  
 
The analysis is confined to regime I which is closer to Minsky’ conceptualization for 
the behaviour of the economy and the emergence of financial fragility. We get: 
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We immediately see that an exogenous rise in the credit rationing responsiveness to 
banks’ fragility, obtains the result of a downward shift and a smaller slope for both of 
0Y  and 0BF  isoclines (see equations (37) and (38) respectively). As far as the 
former isocline is concerned this is because banks’ fragility has a more negative 
impact on effective investment and thereby in output; hence the accumulated amount 
of loans of firms has to decrease in order for output to remain at the same level. 
Furthermore, an increase in the credit rationing responsiveness to banks’ fragility 
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shifts the isocline 0BF  downwards according to equation (38). This is because the 
higher banks’ fragility increases the amount of loans that are credit rationed and hence 
decreases the effective amount of new loans. As a result, at the same level of output, 
banks’ fragility shifts down. We can see the new equilibrium point E1 in figure 6. In 
the new equilibrium point the banks’ fragility is lower, while output is larger. Hence, 
it follows that an increase in the parameter under investigation makes the economy 
centre around an equilibrium point that exhibits lower banks’ fragility and higher 
output. 
 
It is also essential to note that the increase in the credit rationing responsiveness to 
banks’ fragility has an important impact on the intercept and the slope of the 
demarcation line of firms’ fragility as equation (39) pinpoints. This captures the 
fragility firms in figures 1 and 3. In particular, this line shifts downwards, which 
implies that the area that corresponds to speculative firms becomes smaller. It is 
therefore clear that a more conservative banking stance drives down banks’ fragility 
and also increases the area of hedge firms.  
 
Fig. 6. An increase in the credit rationing responsiveness  
to banks’ fragility under regime I. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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places emphasis on the interaction between banks and the real economy, as well as on 
the financial structures that are likely to emerge as a result of this interaction. In our 
analysis we made a distinction among four different financial structures for the 
economy, based on both the fragility of firms and the fragility of banks.  
 
In the dynamic analysis we distinguished between two different regimes. Under the 
first regime there is a high propensity of households to consume out of wage income; 
further, the responsiveness of firms’ desired investment and banks’ credit rationing to 
output changes is high. It turns out that the increase in output overshoots the fragility 
of banks since the increase that it brings about in the amount of new loans 
overcompensates the rise in deposits. Furthermore, the product market is 
characterized by a disequilibrium condition. We showed that under this regime the 
economy is likely to follow a cyclical pattern where banks follow the euphoric 
expectations of firms contributing to the emergence of financial fragility. These 
euphoric expectations are reflected on the credit rationing behaviour that permits loan 
expansion in the upswing and restricts credit availability in the downturn.  
 
Under regime II, there is a low propensity of households to consume out of wage 
income and the same holds for the responsiveness of firms’ desired investment and 
banks’ credit rationing to output changes. A higher level of output slows down the 
fragility of banks; further, there is an equilibrium adjustment mechanism in the 
product market. In this case, the economy can eventually reach a situation 
characterized either by hedge firms and hedge banks or by speculative firms and 
speculative banks. This depends crucially on the initial conditions. 
 
Our analysis can lead us to argue that the interaction between banks and the real 
economy is likely to lead to financial structures that are susceptible to instability. 
However, it was also illustrated that the fragility of the economy can substantially 
decline if banks take more into consideration their liquidity risk in the credit rationing 
procedures. This can be for instance attained if adequate institutional reforms are to be 
implemented, which can lead banks to take more into account their liquidity when 
they provide credit to borrowers. 
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